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a married woman, other than those regarding such property. This
is well settled in all the cases that have come before the court since
the passage of the Act of 1846, which was the first departure from
the doctrine of the common law in the legislation of this state;-
see authorities cited in defendant's brief. It seems wholly unne-
cessary to refer to the cases upon this subject in our reports. A
single case will suffice ;--see Shannon v. 0annezy, 44 N. H. 592,
where it was held that "a married woman is not bound by a pro-
missory note given during coverture, although at the time of her
marriage she had, by inheritance, both real and personal estate,
unless it be shown that such estate was held to her sole and sepa-
rate use, and that the promise was made in respect to that estate."
There can be no pretence that the contract made by this defend-
ant with the plaintiff had any reference to or connection with any
property held by her in her own right. It follows, therefore, that
this action cannot be maintained.
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SUPREME COURT .OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.2
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ACTION.
Joinder of Parties-ot necessary where no lUzity of Estate.-The
plaintiffs were owners of the franchise of a ferry over the Delaware river
from the town of C. to the opposite Pennsylvania shore, under a grant
by the legislature of New Jersey. One D. was the owner of the land-
ing on the Pennsylvania shore, and had a grant from the legislature of
Pennsylvania of the exclusive right of ferriage from that shore. By
arrangement between the owners of the two franchises, a ferry was run
between the two landings for mutual benefit. The ferry was made
valueless by the erection of the defendants' bridge over the river. In pro-
ceedings to recover compensation for the injury to the ferry, under de-
fendants' charter, held, that the action was properly brought by the
plaintiffs, without joining the owner of the Pennsylvania franchise.
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 22 of his Reports.
2 From John 3,. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 55 N. H. Reports.
3 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq.; to appear in vol. 9 of his Reports.
4 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Ohio State Reports.
6 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 77 Pa. State Reports.
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There being no unity of estate in the several owners of the two fran-
chises, the interest affected was several, and although the injury to each
was due to -a common cause, separate actions must be brought : Colum-
bia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 9 Vroom.
AGENT.
Tenant of Corporation, tnder Lease made by Agent, cannot diTute
Agent's Authority-Ratification of Agent's Acts-Evidence of Autho-
a tenant, enters into possession of premises under a parol lease,
made by the attorney of a corporation,'the tenant will not be permitted
to dispute the agent's authority if the company subsequently ratifies the
agent's act: Brahn v. Jersey City Forge Comrany, 9 Vroom.
An agent who demands possession for his principal, must have autho.
rity to make the demand at the time of making it. A subsequent as-
sent on the part of the landlord will not establish, by relation, a notice
given in the first instance without authority : Id.
It is not necessary to prove an express authority to the agent; it may
be inferred from circumstances which show the concurrence of the prin-
cipal in his act: Id.
It is not necessary to show the tenant by proof at the time of the
service that the agent had due authority; it is sufficient if such autho-
rity actually exists : Id.
Parol Proof ofAgency.-Agency, as a question of fact, may be proved
by the acts, declarations or conduct of the principal and agent, although
the agent was .appointed by power of attorney: Columbia Bridge Co. v.
Geisse, 9 Vroom.
AMENDMENT.
Pleading-False Imprisonment.-In trespass for assault and battery,
the declaration may be amended so as to include an allegation of unlaw-
ful detention or imprisonment: Cahill v. Terrio, 55 N. H.
ATTACHMENT.
Municipal Corporation subject to.-A municipal corporation is sub-
ject to garnishment under our attachment act: Mayor, &c., of Jersey
City v. Horton, 9 Vroom.
ATTORNEY.
Authority to referpending Cause.-Au attorney of record, in an action
which had been sent to a referee by order of court, signed an agreement
in writing that the report of the referee shquld be final, and the agree-
ment was entitled as of the term of the Circuit Court, to which the report
was to be made. Held, that his client was :bound by such agreement:
Brooks v. New Durham, 55 N. H.
BANKRUPTCY.
FrVaud-Adverse Proceedings tnder a Judgment by Default, not
Fraudulent per se.-A creditor sued a debtor and obtained judgment by
default, under which his goods were sold by the sheriff; within four
months, proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced against the debtor,
who was adjudged a bankrupt. These proceedings were not per se in
fraud of the Bankrupt Law, although the creditor had reason to believe
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that the debtor was insolvent at the time: Louchetnb Brothers v. IHenszey,
77 Pa.
In an action against the marshal for the sale of goods claimed to be
the plaintiff's, although the uncontradicted evidence of plaintiff showed
a clear case of fraud in fact, the question of fraud was for the jury: Id.
Actual collusion, or fraud in fact, is always for the jury: Id.
Renewal of Security within Four Months of Decree-Fraud.---Where
a person owing money, principal and interest, tbr some time overdue,
but secured by mortgage, accounts with his creditor and on computa-
tion a sum is found as due for the principal and interest added together,
any new mortgage given for the whole and on the same property on
which the former mortgage was given, is not, upon satisfiction being
entered on the old mortgage, to be considered as a new security and so
open to attack under the Bankrupt Law7 if made within fbur months
before a decree in bankruptcy against the debtor. If the old security
was not a preference, neither will the new one be so. They are to be
considered as being for the same debt: Burhisel v. Firman, 22 Wall.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.
Executed and Executory Contracts.-On the 31st of July 1863, dur-
ing the late rebellion, E. and C., owning certain crops of cotton in Wil-
kinson county, Mississippi, executed a paper thus:
"We have, this 31st of July 1863, sold unto Mr. L. our crops of
cotton, now lying in the county aforesaid, numbering about 2100 bales,
at the price of ten cents per pound, currency, the said cotton to be de-
livered at the landing of Fort Adams, and to be paid fbr when weighed.
Mr. L. agreeing to furnish, at his cost, the bagging, rope, and twine
necessary to bale the cotton unginned, and we do acknowledge to htave
receired, in order to confirm this contract, the sum of thirty dollars. This
cotton will be received and shipped by the house of D. & Co., New Or-
leans, and from this date is at the risk of Mr. L. This cotton is said to
have weighed an average of 500 pounds when baled."
At the time of making the contract, the cotton baled was stored under
a covering of boards, and a small part of the cotton (about twenty bales)
not baled, was in the gin-house on the Buffalo Bayou, about ten miles
from the Mississippi river, at a place known as "The Rocks," or "Fel-
ter's Plantation," then without the Federal military lines; and C. and
L. were together there. Immediately after the sale, L. employed a
person, living near where the cotton was stored, to watch and take care
of the same, and paid him therefbr; and this person continued his care
of it, till it was taken possession of in the name of the United States.
.Reld, that, notwithstanding the words above italicized, the paper of the
31st of July 1863 was executory only and had not divested E. and C.
of their property in the cotton; no money but the thirty dollars having
been paid, and nothing else done in execution of the contract ; and that
in a suit for the proceeds of it under the Captured and Abandoned Pro-
perty Act, which gives to the -%owner" a right to recover, under certain
circumstances, property captured or abandoned during the late civil
war, they alone could sue: The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall.
The same E. and C. (or rather E. alone, who had now become sole
owner of the cotton) subsequently to the above-quoted contract with L.,
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made another contract with N. (he not having notice of the first con-
tract), by which H. contracted for the sale to N. "for so much of the
2100 bales as N. should get out in safety to a market, for the price of
151. per bale, to be paid at Liverpool. The risk of the cotton Lu be on
the vendors." Held, equally, but as a matter even more plain than in
the former case, that no property passed by the contract ; no cotton ever
having.been got out. Held, further, that this was not altered by a letter
in these words from the owners of the cotton:
" It having been agreed on between you and myself, that I sell to you
all the cotton of E. and C. now baled and under shed, for the price of
151. sterling, per bale, payable in Liverpool, you will cause the same to
be placed to my credit with J. A. J. & Co., of Liverpool:" Id.
CHURCH. See Taxation.
Presyterian Mlurch Government-Acts of ]Synod ultra vires.-In the
Reformed Presbyterian Church, the General Synod, its highest judica-
tory, is bound by its system of religious principles with the same force
as individual members: McAuley qnd others' Appeal, 17 Pa.
A congregation, organized and holding its property as a constituent
part of any particular religious denomination, or in subordination to its
government, which, without just cause, severs such connection or gov-
ernment, forfeits its rights and property to! those who maintain the
original status: Id.
If such severance be alleged, the burthen is upon those alleging to
show that the others voluntarily, by their own act and without suffi-
cient cause, repounced their connection with the general organization
and invaded the chartered rights of their fellows to the church prbperty:
Id.
A Presbytery of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, deeming that
acts of the Synod were in disregard of the i constitutional rights and
jurisdiction of the Presbytery, resolved to suspend its "relations to
Synod until such action be revoked, or (it) obtain further light, and in
the meantime remain in the Reformed Presbyterian Church," &c. If
the allegations were correct, the Presbytery was justified : .d.
The resolution having been laid before Synod, it, without notice or
trial, resolved that the officers and members of the Presbytery were out
of the jurisdiction of the Synod; and such officers and members of the
Fifth Congregation (and others) who might not identify themselves with
the act of Presbytery, &c., be declared the Fifth Congregation, &c.:
Field, that this action of Synod did not unchurch the Fifth Congrega.
tion, &c.: Id.
By the Presbyterian policy, officers and members of a church cannot
be unchurched by an arbitrary decree of Synod without notice or trial,
although the admitted act complained of be contumacious and worthy
of censure : Id.
A Presbyterian congregation does not select its representatives to its
higher courts; the pastor is a delegate by virtue of his office, and the
lay representative is chosen by the Session ; a congregation cannot be
chargeable with the acts of its delegates: Id,
The excision of the Presbytery could not work the deposition of offi-
cers in the church previously called and ordained : Id.
I Under its legislative powers Synod may dissolve a Presbytery and
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assign its churches to some other Presbytery; under its judicial powers,
it may, tbr proper cause and in due form, depose a presbyter, dissolve
churches and reorganize them: Id.
A legislative act of Synod which forfeits the franchises and property
of a congregation, is in the nature of a judicial sentence and inopera-
tive ; it is uftra vires : Id.
Synod has no more power.to exscind a church than a state legislature
to exseind a county ; the forfeiture of its rights by the church must be
made to appear by a regular judicial decree: Id.
The only constitutional method by which a congregation can express
itself is by congregational meetings regularly called : IT.
The decree of excision of the Synod amounted at most but to a disso-
lution of the original compact of union, leaving the several churches
free to seek their own connections or to arrange themselves as might
seem meet, provided they did not radically depart from the faith or doc-
trines under which they were organized: Id.
CoMMoN CARRIER.
Delivery-Goods marked (7. 0. D.-A bailee of goods, sending them
by a carrier, may sue the carrier fbr the delivery of the same to the
consignee without. payment, when payment was imposed as a condition
of delivery: JMurray v. Warner, 55 N. H.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.
Debtor and Credtor-Payment in Notes not .Legal Curren in the
United States.-After the late rebellion broke out., debtors in the rebel-
lious states had no right to pay to the agents or trustees of their cred-
itors in the loyal states, debts due to these last in any currency other
than legal currency of the United States. Payment in Confederate
notes or in Virginia bank notes (security for whose payment was Con-
federate bodds, and which notes like the bonds themselves never, after
the rebellion broke out,*were safe, and before it closed had become
worthless), held to have been no payment, and the debtor charged de
novo : Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Execution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Ferry.
Title qf Act.-It is sufficient if the title of an act fairly give notice
of its subject so as reasonably to lead to any inquiry into the body of
the bill : State Line and Juniata Railroad Co.'s Appeal. 17 Pa.
An original act was, "To incorporate the State Line, &c., Railroad,"
another was " A supplement to an act to incorporate the State Line, &c.,
Railroad;" another, "A further supplement to an act to incorporate
the State Line, &c., Railroad." All the provisions in both supplements
related to the State Line, &c., road. The object of the supplements
was sufficiently expressed in their titles, the object being germane to
the original act: Id.
CONTEMPT.
Res adjudicata-Setting ip Title after Injunction and Final Decree.
-In the original decree in the case of Texas v. White & Chiles, 7
Wall. 700, the defendants were perpetually enjoined from setting up
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any claim or title to any of the bonds, or coupons attached to them,
which were the subject-matter of the suit. The bill, answers, and pro.
ceedings in the case show that the purpose of the suit was to establish
the title of the state to these bonds, and to ftee it from the embarrass-
ment of the claim of defendants : In re Chiles, 22 Wall.
All parties to the suit were, therefore, bound by the decree as to that
title, and because Chiles was the owner, or no)v asserts himself to be the
owner, through a transaction not set up in his answer, he is not the less
concluded and bound to obey the above injunction : Id.
Notwithstanding he now asserts a different title, or source of title, held
by him when the suit was brought, from the lone imputed to him in the
suit and defended by him, he is in contempt of court in setting up and
seeking to enforce his claim : Md.
Punishments for contempt of court have two aspects, namely : 1. To
vindicate the dignity of the court from disrespect shown to it or its
orders. 2. To compel the performance of some order or decree of the
court which it is in the power of the party to perform and which he re-
fuses to obey : Id.
In the present case there is no part of the original decree which Chiles
can perform which remains unexecuted, and no additional order or de-
cree can be made for him to perform in this proceeding for contempt.
The court, therefore, sentences him to a fine of $250 and costs for his
contempt in setting up a claim of title to seventy-six of the bonds men-
tioned in the decree : Id.
CORPORATION. See Ayat.
Treasurer-Interferenee with by Directors.-The treasurer ofa corpo-
ration is the proper officer charged by law with the custody of its funds,
and responsible for their safe keeping. The directors cannot lawfully
deprive the corporation of the benefit of this responsibility by depositing
the funds with others for safe keeping, or causing such disposition of
the funds to be made, and maybe restrained by injunction from so doing
at the suit of any stockholder, on a proper case being made : Pearson v.
Tower, 55 N. H.
COVENANT. See Deed.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Habeas Corpus; Intoxicating Liquors.
Confessions-Mott'ves of othersjointly Indictedbut on Separate Tat-
Declaration.-The burden of showing that a confession of guilt was
obtained by improper inducements rests with the defendant: Rufer v.
The State, 25 Ohio St.
Where, on a criminal trial, a witness is offered by the state to prove
a confession made by the defendant, to the admission of which testimony
the defendant objects, on the ground that the confession was not volun-
tary, it is the right of the defendant to inquire of the witness and prove
his objection before the confession is given in evidence ; and it is error
for the court, in such case, to refuse him leave to make such examina-
tion until after the examination in chief has been concluded and the
confession given to the jury: Id.
Where it is shown that two or more persons acted in concert in the
commission of an alleged murder, it is competent for the state, by proper
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testimony to show, upon the separate trial of one, the motives which
actuated the others in the alleged homicide: 11.
But ill feeling toward the deceased, on the part of those not on trial,
cannot be proved for the purpose of showing a conspiracy between them
and the defendant to commit the homicide: d.
Nor can the declarations of those not on trial be proved in such ease,
to show their motives or malice on their part toward the deceased, unless
such declarations were made during the pendency of the conspiracy and
in furtherance of the common design: Rd.
Where an act or transaction is given in evidence for the purpose of
showing the motive or state of mind which actuated .the parties to it, it
is proper, at least as a general rule, to permit the parties to be affected
to show the immediate circumstances which led to the transaction, other-
wise the real object of the inquiry may not be ascertained : Id.
DAMAGES. See Eminent Domain.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Execution.
Sale-Secret Trust-Reservation of use of Chattel by Vendor.-'pon
the sale of a chattel, it was agreed as part of the bargain, that the ven-
dor should still have the right to use the thing sold, in and about his
business. Held, that such reservation, being inconsistent with an abso-
lute sale, constituted a secret trust, from which fraud as to the creditors
of the vendor was an inference of law; and that the actual intention of
the parties would not be inquired into: Lang v. Stockwell, 55 N. H.
DVED. See Easement.
Use of Premises Conveyed- Covenant Binding on Grantee's Assigns.
-A stipulation in a deed of conveyance, whereby the grantee, in part
consideration for the conveyance, agrees for himself, his heirs, and
assigns, that the premises conveyed shall not be used or occupied as a
hotel, so long as certain other property, owned by the grantor, shall be
used for that purpose, binds both the grantee and all claiming under
him, and may, in equity, be enforced by injunction: Stines v. Dormun,
25 Ohio St.
EASEMENT.
W ater-Agueduct not having become a legal Easement, will not pass
-under the word Appurtenance in a Deed.-A. conveyed to S. a tract of
land with buildings thereon, supplied with water'rom a spring on land
of H., by an aqueduct. In describing the premises conveyed, no men-
tion was made of the aqueduct, or of any easement in the land of IT.
Following the description was the habendum in these words: "To have
and to hold the said granted premises, with all the privileges and appur-
tenances to the same belonging." field, that the word "appurtenances"
in the habendumn would not be construed to convey an easement in the
land of H., which, not having ripened into a legal right, had not
become legally attached to the premises conveyed : S'paulding v. Abbot,
55 N. H.
By the use of the word "appurtenances" in the habendum of a deed,
an easement will not pass unless legally appurtenant to the land in the
hands of the grantor: Id.
An easement will not pass when not legally appurtenant to the land,
VOL. XXIV.-16
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unless the deed contain proper words describing it, and showing the
intention of the grantor to pass it: Id.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Land Damages-Property in T'ees after Assessments.-After dam-
ages, have been assessed, on a condemnation of land for a railroad, the
trees which may be useful in the construction of the road, standing on
the tract taken, become the property of the company: .Taylor v. New
Y'ork' (C. Long Branch Railroad Co., 9 Vroom.
Land Damages-Legal or Illegal Assessment.-Where a legal and
illegal assessment for benefits are so blended 'that they cannot be sepa-
rated, the whole assessment will be set aside; but application may be
made for a re-assessment: State, Randolph & Stdle, pros., v. City of
Plainield, 9 Vroom.
Land Damages-Notice to Owner.-Where the charter provides for
constructive notice of improvements by publication, personal notice is
not required : State, Boice, pros , v. Plainfield, 9 Vroom.
It is the right of a landowner especially affected by a public improve-
ment, to be informed either by actual or constructive notice of the time
and place appointed for the meeting of counsel to consider their pro-
posed action : Id.
ERROR. See Trial.
Objection not made in Court below.-Wben a party excepts to the
admission of testimony, he is bound to state his objection specifically,
and on error he is confined to the objection so taken: Columbia Bridge
Co. v. Geisse, 9 Vroom.
EVIDENCE. See Agent; Criminal Law; .rror; Ferry.
EXECUTION.
Exemption from-Attachment by Creditor in another State-njunc-
tion.-Under the provisions of the code of civil procedure which relate
to attachment proceedings, and proceedings in aid of execution, the
earnings of a debtor for the three months next preceding the levy of an
attachment, or the issuing of an order for the examination of the debtor,
are exempt from being applied to the payment of his debts, where the
same are necessary for the support of his family: Snook et al. v.
Snetzer, 25 Ohio St.
A citizen of this state may be enjoined from prosecuting an attach-
ment in another state, against a citizen of ithis state, to subject to the
payment of his claim the earnings of the debtor, which, by th6 laws of
this state, are exempt from being applied to the payment of such
claim : Id.
FENCE. See Railroad.
FERRY.
Legislative Grant-Title of Grantee to Landing-Place-Damages for
Destruction of Fer-ry.-The legislative grant of a ferry-franchise is valid,
although the grantee has not title to the landing-places which are
named as the termini of the ferry: Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 9
Yroom.
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The grant by one state of a ferry-franchise over a river which is the
boundary between it and anothei state is valid; and it is not necessary
to the validity of such a grant that there be concurrent action by both
states, nor that the grantee have the right of building beyond the state
by which the grant is made. His franchise for that reason may be less
valuable, but it is good so far as his own property-rights are concerned,
or the jurisdiction of the state making the grant extends: Id.
In an action to recover damages for the injury suffered in the de-
struction of a ferry by the erection of a bridge, the income derived by
the plaintiff from tolls received in preceding years, is competent evi-
dence to show the value of the fbrry : Id.
In such action, the rates of tolls fixed by the Board of Chosen Free-
holders, under the act concerning ferries (Nix. Dig. 337), certified by
the clerk of the board, are competent evidence, although such rates were
fixed when the plaintiff worked it as such, before he had obtained a
legislative grant of the franchise. The evidence was competent to show
what the public authorities having power to establish the rates of
ferriage considered as reasonable tolls for the ferry: Id.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor.
HABEAS CORPUS.
Remew of Ciminal Proceedings by.-Habeas corp is not the proper
mode of redress, where the relator has been convicted of a criminal
offence, and sentenced to imprisonment therefor by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction; if errors or irregularities have occurred in the pro-
ceedings or sentence, a writ of error is the proper remedy: Exparte
Van Hagun, 25 Ohio St.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Mortgage by Wfe-Equities between Wife and Hunsband where Pro-
perty partly paid for by each.-Weyman, by parol, bought land from
O'Hara, took possession, made improvements and paid part of the pur-
chase-money. His wife borrowed the remainder of the purchase-money
from Butterfield, paid it to O'Hara, who made the deed to her, and she
mortgaged to Butterfield, the husband not joining. Held, that the hus-
band owning the equitable title, could not compel a conveyance of her
legal title without refunding the purchase-money she had paid: Butter-
field's Appeal, 77 Pa.
Buttertield recovered judgment against the wife on his mortgage; the
land was sold by the sheriff on a municipal claim against both husband
and wife. Held, that this divested the title of both, and in the distri-
bution of the proceeds, Butterfield was entitled on his judgment to re-
cover the amount of the wife's interest in the fund: being the purchase.
money which she had paid: Id.
If the controversy had been between the husband and wife, the fund
would be divided between them in accordance with their respective
rights and equities; the wife's being the sum paid by her with interest
to the sheriff's sale; and the husband's the remainder of the fund : Id.
Although the mortgage by the wife were void, the judgment conclu-
sively established its execution; the mortgage was merged in the judg.
meat, which could not be collaterally impeached, except for raud: Id.
1238*
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INJUNCTION. See Contempt.
INTEREST.
Special Rate continues after time agreed upon has expired.-Under
the Act of March 14th 18,50, allowing parties to contract for any rate
of intercst, not exceeding ten per cent., a note calling for interest. at a
rate higher than six per -cent. carries the agreed rate after due, and
until paid, as well as during the time it is made to run : Monnett v.
Sturges, 25 Ohio St.
An agreement to pay interest semi-annually, at the rate of ten per
cent. per annum, is not usurious within the. meaning of said act: Id.
Special Agreement not carried out-Excess above Legal Rate.-
Where a party agrees, by note, to pay a certain sum at the expiration
of a year, with interest on it at a rate namcd, the rate being higher than
the customary one of the state or territory where he lives, and does not
pay the note at the expiration of the year, it bears interest not at the
old rate but at the customary or statute rate : Burnhisel v. Firman,
Assignee, 22 Wall.
If, however, the parties calculate interest and make a settlement upon
the basis of the old rate. and the debtor gives new notes and a mortgage
for the whole on that basis, the notes and mortgage are,. independently
of the Bankrupt Act, and of any statute making such securities void in
tote as usurious, valid securities for the amount which would be due on
a calculation properly made. They are bad! only for the excess above
proper interest : Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORs.
Charter of Mu nicipal Corporafion-Power to License-Complaint
for violati'ng Ordinance.-When the charter of a municipal corporation
gives the common council power to license inns and taverns, and algo
power to license wholesale liquor dealers, liquor cannot be sold by the
quart without license, in violation of a city ordinance: Roberson v.
Lambertville, 9 Vroom.
A complaint which charges that the complainant had just cause to
suspect, and does suspect, that the defendant is guilty of violating the
city ordinance, without averring that he is guilty, is not made with such
reasonable certainty as to be the ground of a judicial determination, con-
viction and sentence. It differs from a proceeding to obtain a warrant
to arrest an offender to answer to a more formal complaint by indictment
in another court: Id.
The complaint is fatally defective in failing to state to whom the
liquor was sold, without showing that it was sold to a person unknown.
The only allegation is that it was sold to "each of various and divers
persons:" Id.
The ordinance under which the prosecution was instituted prohibits
the sale of liquor without license, " except such as shall be compounded
and intended to be used as medicine." The complaiut must negative
this exception : Id.
JUDGMENT.
Assignment of Single Bill-Subsequent Assignment of Judgment.-
Pratt entered into a note as surety for Strickland, who at the same time
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assigned to Pratt, as security, and delivered to him, a bill single with
warrant, on which judgment had been entered in favor of Sirickland;
the judgment was not marked to Pratt's use on the record; Pratt paid
the note. Strickland being indebted to Christman, afterwards offered
to confess judgment for this debt or assign the first judgment as collat-
eral. Christman, after examining the record, took the assignment,
Pratt still holding the bill with warrant; the judgment was marked to
Christman's use: feld, he was not a purchaser for value and was post-
poned to Pratt: Pratt's Appeal, 77 Pa.
The non-delivery to Christman of the note on which the judgment
was entered, was not notice of the prior assignment: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Agent.
MORTGAGE.
Recording Assignments-Notice to Sudbsequent Assignees.-Under Act
of April 9th 1849, sect. 14, recording the assignment of a mortgage is
notice to a subsequent assignee: Pepper's Appeal, 77 Pa.
Where recording an instrument under the Acts of Assembly is dis-
cretionary, and the instrument is recorded, all the incidents and force
of a public record attach to the record : Id.
A mortgage was assigned by an attorney in fact of the mortgagee
the assignment was recorded; the assignee permitted the papers to re-
main with the attorney, who afterwards assigned the mortgage to another
who had no actual notice of the prior assignment. Held, that the first
assignee was entitled to the proceeds of the mortgage: .d.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Attachment.
NEGLIGENCE.
Bailment for Hire-Degree of Care.-C. bailed to B. a horse, for
hire, to convey him from D. to S. B., upon arriving at S., put up the
horse in a proper place, and the next morning properly watered, fed,
and cared for her, and left her, intending to return, and in fact return-
ing, within a suitable time to care for her, but having reason to appre-
hend that A., sixteen years of age, would attempt to water the horse
during his absence. A. turned the horse loose to water her, and the
horse, in consequence thereof, became lamed. Held, by the court sit-
ting for trial without a jury, that these facts showed no evidence of lack
of ordinary care and prudence on the part of B., and that he was not
liable to C. for the damages: Chase v. Boody, 55 N. H.
Action for Death caused by- Who may maintain-Damayes.-Under
the act requiring '- compensation for causing death by wrongful act,
neglect or default," etc., persons who had no legal claim for support
upon the deceased may, as next of kin, have an action maintained for
their benefit, to recover the compensation allowed by the statute: Gro-
tenkemper et al. v. Harris, Adm'r, 2:5 Ohio St.
In such cases, in determining the pecuniary injury resulting from the
death, the reasonable expectation of what the next of kin might have
received from the deceased, had he lived, is a proper subject for the
consideration of the jury: Id.
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PLEADING.
Traverse de Injuria.-The replication de injuria, is only allowed where
the plea is in excuse, and not in denial of the cause of action : Ruck.
man ads. Ridgefield Park Railroad Co., 9 Vroom.
It may be used in our practice in actions ex contractu, wherever a
special plea in excuse of- the alleged breach !of contract can be pleaded
as a general traverse to put in issue every material allegation in the plea:
1 1..
When the defendant pleads that the power to cancel a subscription
fur stock is derived from the original agreement between the parties, and
has been exercised, the plaintiff cannot reply by the general traverse d
injuria : 11. VU'AILROAD.
Fences-Liability to Trespasers.-A railroad corporation is not liable
for damages done to cattle unlawfully in a pasture adjoining, and escap-
ing thence upon its roads through defective fences which the railroad is
bound to keep in repair: Giles v. Boston & ZAfaine Railroad, 55 N. H.
REPLEVIN.
Bond in-Liabilty of Surety where Judgment is for a return of the
Goods.-In a suit on a replevin bond given to the sheriff, where the
question whether the proper party to sue is the sheriff or the party for
whose benefit the bond was given, depends upon the code of practice of
Montana Territory, this court will not reverse the decision of the Su-
preme Court of that territory on the question ; that being a question on
the construction of their own code: Sweene4 et al. v. Lomme, 22 Wall.
In a suit on a replevin bond the defendants cannot avail themselves
of the failire of the court to render in the replevin suit the alternative
judgment for the return of the property or for its value; even if that
were an error for which that judgment night be reversed: Id.
If a return be awarded in the replevin suit, the surety is liable on
the condition of the bond to return, and this without execution or other
demand for its return. The judgment establishes the liability: Id.
Nor is this liability to be measured in this action by the value of the
interest in the property of the attachment debtor, fbr whose debt it was
seized by the sheriff. The value of the property at the time it was re-
plevied, limited by the debt still due on the attaching creditor's judg-
ment and the penalty of the replevin bond, are the elements of ascer-
taining the damages in the suit on that bond : Id.
SALE. See Debtor and Creditor.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Re-sate after Default of Purchaser- Change of Conditions.-Land
was sold by the sheriff on the coidition that $50 of the bid should be
paid when it was struck down, and the remainder in ten days; if not
then paid, it might be sold again, and the bidder should pay any defi-
ciency. The bidder failed to comply; the land was exposed under an
alias execution, with the condition that $500 was to be paid when struck
down; it was sold for a smaller sum than the first bid : Held, there was
a change of conditions, and the first bidder was not liable for defi-
ciency: Freernan, Assignee, v. Husband, 77 Pa.
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In an action against a purchaser at sheriff's sale refusing to comply
with the conditions, fbr a difference of bid at a second sale, the suit
must be in the name of the sheriff : Id.
STATUTE.
Constructon-1Apparent Contradictory Povi sons.-Wherc a legisla-
tive act contains two sets of provisions, one giving specific and precise
directions to do a particular thing, and the other in general terms pro-
hibiting certain acts which would, in the general sense of the words
used, include the particular act before authorized, then the general
clause does not control or affect the specific enactment: State, Burtlet,
pros., v. City of Trenton, 9 Vroom.
Confused Ordinance- Aid to Construction from M ap.-Where an
ordinance is confused, yet if by careful reading, aided by a map, it is
intelligible, it will not be avoided fbr uncertainty. Effect must be given,
if possible, to all ordinances regularly passed, and within the powers
conferred by the charter: State, Beke, pros., v. Cit3i of 'laniield, 9Yroom.
Where an ordinance is annulled for want of jurisdiction, by com-
petent notice to the persons affected, the error is fundamental, and can-
not be remedied by subsequent legislation: Id.
TAXATION.
Claim of Exemption from Taxation whether State, County or Mtuni.
c?)pal must be founded on clear Intention of Legislture-Negative Lan.
guaye not sufficient.-A claim of exemption from county and municipal
taxation cannot be supported, any more than a claim from state taxation,
except upon language so strong as that, fairly interpreted, no room is
left for controversy. No presumption can be made in favor of the ex-
eaiption : and if there be reasonable doubt, the doubt is to be solved in
favor of the state : Bailey v. Aagwire, Collector, 22 Wall.
The fact that in an act amending the charter of a railroad corporation
special provision is made for ascertaining the taxes to become due by
the corporation to the state (nothing being said about the manner of as-
certaining other taxes), is not of itself enough to work an exemption
of the property of the corporation from all taxation not levied for state
purposes. Silence, in regard to such other taxes, cannot be construed
as a waiver of the right of the state to levy them. There must be some-
thing said affirmatively, and which is explicit enough to show clearly
that the legislature intended to relieve the corporation from this part
of the burdens borne by other real and personal property, before such
an act shall amount to a contract not to levy them : Id.
A provision in such an act, prescribing a mode for ascertaining the
fax due the state, by which provision the president of the company is
required to furnish to the auditor of the state a statement, under oath, of
the actual cash value of the property to be taxed, on which the company
is directed to pay the tax due the state, within a certain time, to the
treasurer, under penalties, does not, amount to a contract, that the state
will not pass any law to assess the property of the company for taxation
for stave purposes in a different manner: Id.
But if a particular mode has been prescribed for assessing the property
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of a particular company that mode should be followed, until, in some
way, a different mode is prescribed: Id.
Whether or not an act prescribing such particular mode has been im-
pliedly repealed by a general revenue act, not in terms repealing it, is a
matter peculiarly within the province of the highest courts of the state,
whose acts are the subject of the question, to decide. And when such
courts have decided the question, their decision is controlling : Id.
Exenmption of Cliurch Endowment.-Lands held by trustees for a
church, do not constitute a part of the "endowment or fund" of a reli-
gious society, and are not exempt from taxation: State, Nevin, et al.
pros., v. Krollman, Collector, &c., 9 Vroom.
TREsPAss. See Amendment.
TRIAL.
By Court without Jury -Revew of F 'nd'n.-When a cause is tried
by the court, without a jury, by the consent of parties, the court is sub.
stituted in the place of a jury, and its findings on questions of facts
cannot be reviewed by writ of error : Columbia Delaware Bridge Co.
v. Geisse, 9 Vroom.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Mistake as to Encumbrance-Rescission---Euity.-Plantiff bought
a lot at a master's sale, defendant being present and bidding against
him; it was announced at the sale that there was an unopened street
over the lot, -and the purchaser would be entitled to the damages; the
plaintiff afterwards sold the lot to defendant, who also lived near the
street, without informing him of the street. In an action for the pur-
chase-money, the court charged that it was the duty of the plaintiff,
when he sold to defendant, to inform him of the street, and not doing so
was suppression of a material fact which entitled defendant to set-off the
injury by opening the street. Held, to be !error, as withdrawing the
question from the jury: Tenbrooke v. Jahke' 77 Pa. .
When there is a mutual mistake as to an encumbrance on land sold,
equity relieves, not by allowing th"e vendee to keep the property and
price, but by rescinding the contract and restoring the parties to their
former position: Id.
Outstanding Title.-A vendee under articles may set up an outstand-
ing title not in himself, but when he buys such title, he is trustee of
his vendor, and is entitled only to what he paid to perfect the title:
Stephens et al. v. Black et al., 77 Pa. "
VERDICT.
Special -A special verdict requires the jury to find all the material
facts from which the law is to arise, including both disputed and undis"
puted facts: Vansyckel v. Stewart, 77 Pa.
Whatever is not found in a special verdict is to be considered as not
existing; it cannot be aided by intendment or by extrinsic facts appear-
ing on the record-it must be self-sustaining: Id.
